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SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE: YOU CAN'T
HAVE ONE WITHOUT THE OTHER:
A RECOMMENDATION FOR MODEL RULE 7.3
I. INTRODUCTION
A woman arrives at a courthouse with her son. She speaks little
to no English and is a bit overwhelmed by her surroundings. All that
she knows is that her son has been arrested, and she must appear be-
fore a judge somewhere in the building. People brush by her, rush-
ing to make their own respective court appearances. Mr. Solomon
Cohn, an attorney, happens to notice her as he walks by. Cohn asks
her if she needs assistance, to which she replies, "Yes." After she
explains her situation to him, Cohn guides her to the proper court-
room and offers to represent her son's interests.'
While some might view this encounter as a philanthropic or
gratuitous gesture, the Supreme Court of New York held otherwise.2
The court convicted Cohn of the crime of solicitation of business on
behalf of an attorney and sentenced him to an unconditional dis-
charge. In discussing this case, ethicist Monroe Freedman strongly
disagreed with the court's holding.4 He instead proclaimed that
Cohn "should have been given a citation as 'Attorney of the Year.'
5
For most people, the term "attorney solicitation" conjures up
stereotypical images of "ambulance chasing" attorneys who prey on
bed-ridden accident victims. 6 Whether the solicitation occurs in the
1. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY
SYSTEM 118 (1975) (citing in re Cohn, 352 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1974)).
2. See Cohn, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 462.
3. See id.
4. See FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 118.
5. Id.; see also Louise L. Hill, Solicitation By Lawyers: Piercing the First
Amendment Veil, 42 ME. L. REv. 369, 416 (1990) (discussing Freedman's
characterization of attorney Solomon Cohn).
6. See John H. Wilbur, Note, Advertising, Solicitation and Legal Ethics, 7
VAND. L. REv. 677, 684 (1954); Joe Wishcamper, Comment, Benign Solicita-
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personal injury context,7 or simply through the practice of "giving
unsolicited legal advice. . . [and accepting] ... employment result-
ing from such advice," 8 both the United States Supreme Court and
the American Bar Association ("ABA") condemn this practice.
Based on the belief that the primary source of the "substantive
evils" 9 inherent in attorney solicitation is the prospect of pecuniary
gain,' 0 the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.3
prohibits almost all attorney solicitation motivated by a pecuniary
interest.1 Freedman's commendation of the attorney engaged in so-
licitation in the previous scenario, however, suggests that the permis-
sibility of such conduct should not rise or fall based on subjective
motive alone. In fact, Freedman implies that, even if a court exam-
ined a subjective factor such as an attorney's motive, it would also
need to consider objective aspects of the solicitation. These include
the nature of the attorney's actions and the circumstances under
which the solicitation took place.'
2
As it stands today, Model Rule 7.3, which regulates and pro-
scribes attorney solicitation, employs only a subjective analysis in
ascertaining the permissibility of an attorney's conduct.' 3 Model
tion of Clients by Attorneys, 54 WASH. L. REv. 671, 671 (1979); see, e.g.,
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 469 (1978) (concerning attor-
ney Albert Ohrali, who engaged in "ambulance chasing" when he solicited
two automobile accident victims).
7. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 449; see also Attorney Grievance Comm' n v.
Gregory, 536 A.2d 646 (Md. 1988) (addressing solicitation in the criminal
context).
8. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 458.
9. See id. at461.
10. See Victor P. Filippini, Jr., Soliciting Sophisticates: A Modest Proposal
for Attorney Solicitation, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 585, 590 n.34 (1982); see
also Evan R. Levy, Edenfield v. Fane: In-Person Solicitation by Professionals
Revisited-What Makes Lawyers Different?, 58 ALB. L. REV. 261, 280 n.140
(1994) (identifying the stirring up of litigation and assertion of fraudulent
claims as additional evils plaguing attorney solicitation).
11. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3(a) (1998).
But see MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3(b) (1998) (per-
mitting the in-person solicitation of clients with whom an attorney had a prior
professional relationship, or who are family members).
12. See FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 119.
13. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 (1998) ("A
lawyer shall not by in-person or live telephone contact solicit professional em-
ployment from a prospective client... when a significant motive for the law-
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Rule 7.3's legislative history indicates that the ABA instituted a
purely subjective analysis because of its reading of the United States
Supreme Court's holdings in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass 'n14 and
In re Primus.'5 These cases held in part that the evils associated with
solicitation were attributable to an attorney's pecuniary motive.
16
Accordingly, the Court refused to afford First Amendment protection
to attorney solicitation, and effectively prohibited all pecuniary-
motivated attorney solicitations.' 7 Based on its interpretation of the
Court's holding, the ABA promulgated an ethical rule containing a
subjective test proscribing attorney solicitation based solely on the
soliciting attorney's subjective motive.1 8
If the ABA sought to accurately codify the Supreme Court's ap-
proach, however, the language of Model Rule 7.3 is oversimplified.
As Freedman suggests, the Court's treatment of attorney solicitation
should not-and does not-rest on purely subjective criteria.19 In-
deed, the Court's analysis of the respective solicitations in both
Ohralik and Primus contain both subjective and objective compo-
nents. In fact, both Justice Marshall's concurrence in Ohralik2° and
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in In re Primus21 emphasized, to varying
degrees, the need for an objective element in assessing the permissi-
bility of attorney solicitations.
Ironically, over a decade later in Edenfield v. Fane,22 the Court
relied solely on an objective analysis when it distinguished the im-
permissibility of pecuniary-motivated attorney solicitations from
those of accountant solicitations. In Edenfield, the Court struck
down a statute that prohibited accountants from engaging in
yer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain.").
14. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
15. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
16. See id. at 422; Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464.
17. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at456.
18. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 (1998); see
also infra Part IV.
19. See FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 118.
20. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 468-77 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
21. See Primus, 436 U.S. at 440-46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
22. 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
23. See id. at 775-76.
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commercial solicitation when their motive for doing so was purely
24 Eefedopecuniary. The Edenfield Court's emphasis on objective criteria,
such as the nature of the profession and the circumstances surround-
ing the solicitation, reflected the need to incorporate an objective
component into the language of Model Rule 7.3. Therefore, as the
ABA's Ethics 2000 Committee on the Evaluation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct convenes this fall25 to reevaluate Model Rule
7.3, the Committee should revise the solicitation rule to reflect an
analysis with both a subjective and an objective component. Not
only will the inclusion of an objective factor produce a rule that mir-
rors that of the Supreme Court, but it will also better serve public in-
terest and public policy concerns.
This Comment posits that, in amending Model Rule 7.3, the
ABA Ethics 2000 Committee should adopt a two-prong subjective-
objective analysis to determine when attorney solicitations are per-
missible. Part II discusses the history of attorney solicitation, how it
acquired its poor reputation, and why the fears surrounding it require
both subjective and objective criteria to adequately gauge its peril.
Part III examines Model Rule 7.3's pecuniary motive language and
critiques it in light of the legislative history and the rationale behind
its adoption. Part IV explores the United States Supreme Court's
treatment of attorney solicitation and its analysis containing both
subjective and objective criteria in evaluating the propriety of attor-
ney solicitations. Part IV demonstrates how the Court's reliance on
objective factors in effectively upholding a pecuniary-motivated ac-
countant solicitation in Edenfield necessitates the addition of an ob-
jective component to Model Rule 7.3. Part V analyzes the public
policy rationales that expose the weaknesses of a purely subjective
test, thereby demonstrating the need for an objective analysis. Part
VI concludes that a test encompassing both a subjective and an ob-
jective component not only codifies the desires expressed by Justices
Marshall and Rehnquist's minority opinions, but helps restore ac-
countability to a legal system that will continue to anonymously
24. See id. at 777.
25. For more information on the ABA Ethics 2000 Committee and the re-
drafting of the Model Rules, see American Bar Association, Center for Profes-
sional Responsibility (visited May 21, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/
ethics2k.html>.
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victimize pro se litigants so long as a purely subjective solicitation
rule exists.
II. REPLETE WITH A REPUTATION: ATTORNEY SOuCITATION AND ITS
HISTORY
Attorney solicitation, frequently derided as "ambulance chas-
ing,''26 conjures up pejorative, stereotypical images of attorneys who
coerce bed-ridden accident victims into retaining them as counsel to
sue for their personal injuries. While not limited to the personal in-
jury context,27 almost all attorney solicitation activity has been con-
demned by the United States Supreme Court28 because of a well-
established fear of the "substantive evils" 29 inherent in and perpetu-
ated by such activity. 0 This fear clearly stems from the long history
of ill-repute associated with attorney solicitation.
Solicitation traces its roots, and its pejorative reputation, back to
ancient Greek and Roman times. Society had viewed attorneys who
actively sought out clients with skepticism and suspicion 3' because
of the way they sought to interfere in litigation proceedings. Appro-
priately called "intervenors" 32 in Greek society, these attorneys often
took advantage of the limited privileges they had to intervene on be-
half of others and were frequently charged with abusing the legal
26. See Wilbur, supra note 6, at 684; see, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 469 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (illustrating a classic example of an attorney engaged in "ambu-
lance chasing").
27. See Wilbur, supra note 6, at 684-85. See generally Wishcamper, supra
note 6, at 675 (contrasting "ambulance chasing" with benign forms of solicita-
tion).
28. But see In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 422 (carving out an exception to the
otherwise prophylactic ban on attorney solicitation for non-pecuniary solicita-
tions that seek to preserve civil and political rights).
29. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at461.
30. See Filippini, supra note 10, at 590 n.34; see also Levy, supra note 10,
at 280 n.140 (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 461 (explaining that such evils in-
clude "stirring up litigation, assert[ing] fraudulent claims, debasing the legal
profession, and [inflicting] potential harm to the solicited client in the form of
overreaching, overcharging, underrepresentation, and misrepresentation")).
31. See Hill, supra note 5, at370 & n.13.
32. Id. at 372-73.
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process. They were regarded as "sycophants," or "individual[s]
who voluntarily undertook the prosecution of a matter, being moti-
vated by money, prestige, [and] political advantage, '34 or who did so
purely to harass their opponents. This aura of distrust that emerged
in Greek society carried over into Roman times.36 Even where advo-
cacy was a recognized profession, 37 Roman attorneys, or "calumnia-
tors, '38 also vexatiously litigated frivolous or baseless actions on be-
half of litigants.3 9 This conduct fueled society's continued distrust of
advocates' involvement in the legal system.
Even when the practice of obtaining legal representation carried
over into the English legal tradition,40 it was still accompanied not
only by the same "ancient prejudice against representation, but also
[by] ... the perception that these advocates encouraged... profit-
seeking lawsuits in particular."' 4' English advocates, or "champi-
ons," 42 unsurprisingly developed reputations for being dishonest,
greedy individuals who, much like their predecessors, were moti-
vated purely by their own financial interests.43  Champions were
said to perpetuate and promote barratry,44 champerty,45 and
33. See id. at 372-73 & nn.23-26.
34. Id. at 371.
35. See id. at 372 & n.23.
36. See id. at372.
37. See id. at 373.
38. Id.
39. See id. For a more thorough discussion of the historical treatment of
attorney solicitation, see HENRY SANDWITH DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS (1953)
and MICHAEL GAGARIN, EARLY GREEK LAw (1986).
40. See Hill, supra note 5, at 374.
41. Id. at 375.
42. Id. at 370.
43. See id. at 375.
44. Black's Law Dictionary defines "barratry" as "[t]he offense of fre-
quently exciting and stirring up quarrels and suits, either at law or otherwise."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 150 (6th ed. 1990); see also Robert E. Gipson,
Comment, Advertising, Solicitation and the Profession 's Duty to Make Legal
CounselAvailable, 81 YALE L.J. 1181, 1181-82 & 1182 n.6 (1972) (comparing
the prohibition of solicitation to "historical animus against 'stirring up litiga-
tion' and to the prevention of barratry, champerty and maintenance... ").
45. Black's Law Dictionary defines "champerty" as a "bargain between a
stranger and a party to a lawsuit by which the stranger pursues the party's
claim in consideration of receiving part of any judgment proceeds;... one type
of 'maintenance. . . ."' BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 231 (6th ed. 1990); see
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maintenance. 46 Hence, the English legal system traditionally dis-
couraged its attorneys from soliciting business.47
In modeling its legal system after the English, the proponents of
the American legal system acquired the same distaste for attorney
solicitations.48 In fact, the American Bar Association's unfavorable
view of solicitation prompted it to enact the Canons of Ethics in
1908.49 The original Canons codified a solicitation prohibition, de-
nouncing attorney solicitation as "unprofessional" behavior.5 °
However, with respect to the rules proscribing solicitation, the
ethical canons were regarded as ineffective.5 ' Much of their failure
was attributable to the ABA's use of vague and ambiguous lan-
guage, 2and the overall failure of the Canons to properly govern at-
torney conduct.5 3 The need for more decisive language and finite
standards5 4 forced drafters of the Canons, and later the Model Code
also Gipson, supra note 44, at 1182 n.6 (explaining the meaning and historical
significance of champerty).
46. Black's Law Dictionary defines "maintenance" with respect to lawsuits
as "[a]n officious intermeddling in a lawsuit ... or assisting either party, with
money or otherwise, to prosecute or defend the litigation." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 954 (6th ed. 1990); see also Gipson, supra note 44, at 1182 n.6
(explaining the meaning and historical significance of maintenance).
47. See Hill, supra note 5, at 375 n.51.
48. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 371 (1977). Bates
explained that the ban on attorney advertising and commercial speech first
originated as a rule of etiquette in the legal profession. See id. The English
viewed commercial speech as being affiliated with "trades," which differed
from the view that a law practice was an esteemed form of public service. See
also, e.g., DRINKER, supra note 39, at 210-12 (discussing the historical treat-
ment of attorney solicitation). Note also that one functional and contemporary
equivalent of an American "lawyer," ironically enough, is an English "solici-
tor." See Hill, supra note 5, at 377 & n.60.
49. See Gipson, supra note 44, at 1182. See generally DRINKER, supra note
39, at 23-25 (providing additional historical background on the evolution of
American legal ethics).
50. See CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 27 (1908). The original
wording of the Canon states that the "solicitation of business by... personal
communications, or interviews, not warranted by personal relations, is unpro-
fessional." Id.
51. See FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 127.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. The ABA's Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards
sought to revise the Canons for three main reasons: first, the Canons failed to
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of Professional Responsibility,55 to pinpoint the precise solicitous
conduct the Committee sought to proscribe. In doing so, the Com-
mittee could better draft a rule proscribing attorney solicitation that
would effectively assuage any fears associated with such ill-reputed
conduct.
The drafters identified seven concerns that an ethics rule gov-
erning solicitation should address. First, the rules should seek to
protect potential clients from "deception, overreaching, undue influ-
ence, intimidation, and misrepresentation" by attorneys who may co-
erce them into retaining the attorney's services. 56 Second, the rules
should shield clients from situations where an attorney's undue in-
fluence could force them into making uninformed and impromptu
decisions.17 Specifically, the drafters believed that face-to-face con-
tact is "offensive to the sensibilities of a client"5' and invasive of
one's privacy.59 Moreover, such direct contact with a client fails to
address important areas of attorney conduct; second, they failed to offer guide-
lines as to practical sanctions for behavior; and third, they proved incapable of
addressing the changing conditions in both the legal system and society at
large. See id. at 129. Hence, the Committee formulated a revised set of guide-
lines, namely the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which replaced
the Canons in 1969. Model Code DR 2-104 replaced Canon 27 as the rule
governing attorney solicitation. It stated, subject to limited exceptions, that "a
lawyer who has given in-person unsolicited advice to a layperson that he
should obtain counsel or take legal action shall not accept employment result-
ing from that advice.. . ." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DR 2-104 (1983).
55. In 1984, the ABA replaced the Model Code of Professional Responsi-
bility with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The ABA felt that Model
Code DR 2-104 was too restrictive. See Lori B. Andrews, The Model Rules
and Advertising, 68 A.B.A. J. 808, 811 (1982) (discussing features of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.3 which improved and more
clearly defined the scope of attorney solicitation).
56. Filippini, supra note 10, at 590 (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n,
436 U.S. 447, 462 (1978); see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-4 (1983) (stating that a "lawyer who volunteers in-
person advice that one should obtain the services of a lawyer generally should
not himself accept employment; compensation, or other benefit in connection
with that matter").
57. See Comment A Critical Analysis of Rules Against Solicitation By
Lawyers, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 674, 683 (1958).
58. Id.
59. See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 644-45 (1951) (upholding a
municipal ordinance prohibiting the door-to-door solicitation of magazine sub-
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give the client an opportunity to compare the quality of the soliciting
attorney's services, prices, and qualifications with those of others not
before the client. 60  Without this opportunity to interview and re-
search various attorneys, clients are denied the critical opportunity to
make an informed choice regarding which attorney is capable of best
representing their interests.6'
Third, the rules should work toward eliminating the fear that in-
person solicitations will "stir up litigation,' , 62 and flood the courts
with lawsuits.63 Fourth, the rules should address the fear that an at-
torney may subordinate a client's best interest to that of an attorney's
own pecuniary interest if and when the two conflict.64 Indeed, so-
licitation might arguably increase fraudulent claims because a solic-
iting attorney not only "suggests to the claimant the possibility of as-
serting a . . .claim, but also assures [the claimant] of professional
support in prosecuting [the] suit.
65
The fifth concern expressed a belief that the ethics rules gov-
erning solicitation should preserve the standards, reputation, and in-
tegrity of the legal profession.66 This rationale derives from a fear
that "disrespect for lawyers leads to a disrespect for [the] law."
67
Sixth, the rules should aim "at maintaining the self-perceived
status of lawyers., 68  This concern stemmed from the notion of
scriptions because such activity constituted an invasion of privacy).
60. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457-58.
61. See id.
62. Comment, supra note 57, at 675.
63. See generally id. (discussing the implications of stirring up litigation).
64. See Filippini, supra note 10, at 590 n.34. But see Charles A. Pulaski,
Jr., In-Person Solicitation and the First Amendment: Was Ohralik Wrongly
Decided?, 1979 ARiz. ST. L.J. 23, 55-60 (1979) (arguing that an attorney's
better judgment can be equally blurred by political motivations).
65. Comment, supra note 57, at 679 (paraphrasing Report of the Committee
of Censors, Philadelphia BarAss'n, 14 MAss. L.Q. Supp. 44, 59 (1928)).
66. See Filippini, supra note 10, at 591 (ascertaining that in-person solicita-
tions are not per se undignified). Filippini argued that if an attorney solicits in
a discrete, tactful, and non-coercive manner, such behavior could arguably re-
store a sense of professionalism to the legal profession. See id.
67. Comment, supra note 57, at 681. The article also contemplates the ar-
gument "that solicitation works to the detriment of the legal profession by con-
centrating legal business in the hands of a few lawyers." Id. at 682.
68. Filippini, supra note 10, at 591-92.
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'professional hubris"; 69 since attorneys are members of an esteemed
and "learned profession [that] perform[s] a public service, 70 they
should "avoid the commercialism of ordinary trades and busi-
nesses." 7' Lastly, a solicitation rule should decrease competition in
the profession, promote harmony, and prevent "client stealing.
72
With these concerns in mind, the ABA sought to revamp the Model
Code and its solicitation canon, and formulate a rule which would
eradicate the evils of attorney solicitation.
Ill. ThE DEVELOPMENT OF AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY BEHIND
MODEL RULE 7.3
After considering the foregoing fears and concerns, the ABA
drafted the Model Code solicitation provisions to serve as an outright
ban on all solicitation activity. 73 The ABA believed that an outright
69. Id. at 592.
70. Id.
71. Id. (paraphrasing Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 368 (1977)).
72. Id. Filippini infers this from his reading of the Model Code of Profes-
sional Conduct EC 2-3, EC 2-4, DR 2-103 &DR 2-104. See id. at 592 n.44.
73. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-104 (A)
(1983) (stating that "a lawyer who has given in-person unsolicited advice to a
layperson that he should obtain counsel or take legal action shall not accept
employment resulting from that advice... "); see also Hill, supra note 5, at
382 ("In a blanket provision, the Canons asserted that solicitation of business
by ... personal communications, or interviews, not warranted by personal re-
lations, is unprofessional"); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
EC 2-4 (1983) ("A lawyer who volunteers in-person advice that one should
obtain the services of a lawyer generally should not himself accept employ-
ment, compensation, or other benefit in connection with that matter.").
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct have in fact permitted only a few exceptions to the oth-
erwise blanket ban on in-person attorney solicitation. The Model Code and the
Model Rules do permit the in-person solicitation of business from a friend or
family member, where a personal relationship existed between the attorney and
the client prior to a legal employment relationship, or where the lawyer is mo-
tivated by considerations other than the lawyer's pecuniary gain. See MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-104(A) & EC 2-4 (1983);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3(a) & cmt.(4) (1998).
Another exception is one carved out for pro bono organizations and other legal
aid services. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-
104(A)(2)&(3) (1983); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
7.3(d) & cmt.(4)&(6) (1998). Furthermore, the Model Code permits employ-
ment resulting from the offering of unsolicited advice to a close friend,
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ban was necessary in order to abolish the peril and harm that invaria-
bly infected every in-person attorney solicitation. The ban, charac-
terized as a "prophylactic" measure,74 sought to shield lay people
from any danger resulting from such an encounter.75
However, the ABA drafters of the Model Code provisions were
forced to reconsider the outright ban on solicitation76 when the
United States Supreme Court handed down their decisions in Ohralik
v. Ohio State Bar Ass '77 and In re PriMus.78 These opinions eluci-
dated the fact that "there might be some instances in which in-person
contact by a lawyer may produce fewer dangers[,] or even be in the
potential clients' best interest. 79 In formulating a rule proscribing
in-person solicitation, the ABA looked to the Supreme Court for
guidance in developing one that clarified an attorney's role, and pro-
vided a restrictive, yet constitutional framework to guide the ethical
practice of law.80 The product of the ABA's revision of the existing
Model Code provision was the codification of a modified set of eth-
ics rules known as the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.' In-
deed, the legislative history of Model Rule 7.3 clearly indicates that
whereas the Model Rules only permit solicitations of a friend where there has
been a prior professional or personal relationship. Compare MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-104 (A)(1) & EC 2-4 (1983) with
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3(a) & cmt.(4) (1998) (il-
lustrating the distinction between the Model Code and Model Rules on this
point).
74. See Ohralikv. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,464 (1978).
75. Note that both the Model Code and the Model Rules allow for excep-
tions to the otherwise "outrighf' ban on in-person solicitation. See supra note
73 and accompanying text.
76. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-104 & EC
2-4 (1983).
77. '436 U.S. at 468.
78. 436 U.S. at438-39.
79. Andrews, supra note 55, at 811.
80. See ELAINE REICH, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 182-83 (1987).
81. While both the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Model Code
of Professional Responsibility are in effect today, the majority of jurisdictions
adhere to the Model Rules. In comparing the language of Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 7.3 with Model Code of Professional Responsibility
DR 2-104(A)(1)-(3), which banned virtually all employment resulting from a
solicitation, it is clear that ModelRule 7.3 allows more latitude. See supra note
73 and accompanying text.
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the rule parallels the precise language and approach used by the Su-
preme Court in its treatment of a pecuniary-motivated attorney so-
licitation in Ohralik.82 Accordingly, Model Rule 7.3 reads as fol-
lows:
(a) A lawyer shall not by in-person or live telephone contact
solicit professional employment from a prospective client
with whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional
relationship when a significant motive for the lawyer's do-
ing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain.
(b) A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment from
a prospective client by written or recorded communication
or by in-person or telephone contact even when not other-
wise prohibited by paragraph (a), if: ... (2) the solicitation
involves coercion, duress or harassment.8
3
As the language of Model Rule 7.3 indicates, the ABA inter-
preted the Supreme Court's holding in Ohralik to signify that the
"evil [in solicitation activity] was thought likely to occur when a
82. The Drafting Committee actually rejected an earlier version of the rule
which did not contain the pecuniary motive language from the Ohralik opin-
ion. The earlier version read:
(a) A lawyer may initiate personal contact with a prospective client for
the purpose of obtaining professional employment only in the follow-
ing circumstances and subject to the requirements of paragraph (b):
(1) if the prospective client is a close friend, relative, former client or
one whom the lawyer reasonably believes to be a client; (2) under the
auspices of a public or charitable legal services organization; or; (3)
under the auspices of a bona fide political, social, civic, fraternal, em-
ployee or trade organization whose purposes include but are not lim-
ited to providing or recommending legal services, if the legal services
are related to the principal purposes of the organization.
(b) A lawyer shall not contact, or send a written communication to, a
prospective client for the purpose of obtaining professional employ-
ment if. (1) the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the
physical, emotional or mental state of the person is such that the per-
son could not exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer; (2)
the person has made known to the lawyer a desire not to receive com-
munications from the lawyer; or (3) the communication involves coer-
cion, duress or harassment.
REICH, supra note 80, at 182-83.
83. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 (1998) (emphasis
added).
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lawyer significantly motivated by pecuniary gain privately solicited
employment. ' 4 Therefore, the ABA implemented a solicitation ban
which employed the attorney's subjective pecuniary motive as a
gauge for improper conduct. Based on its reading of Ohralik, the
ABA believed that "there [was] far less likelihood that a lawyer
would engage in abusive practices against an individual ... where
the lawyer [was] motivated by considerations other than the lawyer's
pecuniary gain.
'85
In codifying a purely subjective test, however, the ABA failed to
exactly mirror the Supreme Court's analysis of attorney solicitations.
Rather, upon close examination of the Court's opinions in both
Ohralik and Primus, and later in Edenfield,8 6 one observes that the
Court actually employed both objective and subjective factors in its
analysis of attorney solicitation. Moreover, the Court recognized
that while it was important to assess the soliciting attorney's subjec-
tive motives, objective factors--such as the circumstances under
which the solicitation took place--should also be considered in as-
certaining the permissibility of a solicitation. 87 By including objec-
tive factors in its analysis, the Court could obtain a more precise idea
of exactly what transpired during the solicitation encounter. There-
fore, to best reflect the Supreme Court's approach, the ABA Ethics
2000 Committee should redraft Model Rule 7.3 to include both an
objective and subjective analysis.
IV. ATORNEY SoLIcrrATION ANALYZED: THE SUPREME COURT'S
Two-STEP APPROACH
A. Commercial Speech and Solicitation: A Foreshadowing of Sorts
Even before the Supreme Court addressed solicitation in the
context of the legal profession, its treatment of other forms of com-
mercial speech foreshadowed its future conclusions about attorney
84. REICH, supra note 80, at 183-84.
85. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 cmt.(4) (1998)
(emphasis added).
86. 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
87. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464; Primus, 436 U.S. at 427-35, 442-44
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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solicitation. Traditionally, commercial speech had gone unprotected.
The Court, however, finally afforded limited constitutional protec-
tion to commercial speech, or speech that does "no more than pro-
pose a commercial transaction,, 88 when it carved out an entirely new
area of constitutionally protected speech 89 in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.90 There, the
Court invalidated a Virginia statute that prevented a pharmacist from
advertising prices of prescription drugs. 91 In employing a balancing
test, the Court found that the interests of free enterprise and the free
flow of commercial information outweighed the state's interest in
"maintaining a high degree of professionalism on the part of licensed
pharmacists.
' 92
In seeking to preserve those interests, however, the Court did
not grant absolute protection to all forms of commercial speech. In
fact, the Court specifically limited the holding of Virginia Board of
Pharmacy to its facts, and refused to extend its rationale to other pro-
fessions, let alone attorney commercial speech. 93 Rather, in the case
of professional solicitations conducted by professionals, the Court
would "require consideration of quite different factors [since] ...
lawyers ... render professional services of almost infinite variety
and nature, with the consequent enhanced possibility for confusion
and deception . . . . This statement is significant because it
88. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Counsel,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)). For more back-
ground on the commercial speech doctrine, see Fred S. McChesney, Commer-
cial Speech In the Professions: The Supreme Court's Unanswered Questions
and Questionable Answers, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 45 (1985) and Judith L. Maute,
Scrutinizing Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation Rules Under Commercial
Speech andAntitrustDoctrine, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487 (1986).
89. See Levy, supra note 10, at 261-62.
90. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). Commercial speech traveled a long, complex
road before finally receiving limited constitutional protection. For a chronol-
ogy and explanation of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, see Jeffrey M.
Brandt, Attorney In-Person Solicitation: Hope for a New Direction and Su-
preme Court Protection After Edenfield v. Fane, 25 U. TOL. L. REv. 783, 786
n.27 (1994).
91. See Virginia Bd. ofPharmacy, 425 U.S. at 749-50.
92. Id. at 766.
93. See id. at 773 n.25.
94. Id.
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demonstrates that the Court regarded professional solicitation-spe-
cifically that of attorneys-as distinct from other forms of commer-
cial speech. In dicta, moreover, the Court indicated that the very
nature of professional solicitations required the consideration of dif-
ferent factors when analyzing and evaluating professional solicitation
cases.95 This insight into the Court's jurisprudence proved to be
quite instrumental in examining the Court's eventual treatment of
attorney solicitation cases.
B. Leaving the Balancing Behind: The Supreme Court's
Employment of a Two-Prong, Subjective and Objective Analysis of
Attorney Solicitation
1. The two prongs revealed
Although the Court alluded to attorney solicitation in other
commercial speech cases, 96 the Supreme Court finally directly
95. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 366 (1977). In Bates, the
Supreme Court heard a case involving an advertisement for legal services that
two young attorneys placed in a local newspaper. See id. at 354. The Court
struck down a ban prohibiting attorney advertising on the grounds that while a
state may proscribe false and misleading attorney advertising, it can not im-
pose a blanket ban, as such a prohibition was unconstitutional. See id. at 383-
84. The Court was careful to limit the Bates holding to its facts, and thereby
dispelled any hope of applying it to attorney in-person solicitations. See id. at
366. The Court condemned the "in-person solicitation of clients--at the hos-
pital room or the accident site, or in any other situation that breeds undue in-
fluence... [because it] ... might well pose dangers of overreaching and mis-
representation not encountered in ... advertising." Id. at 366. While the
Court's dicta did not proscribe it completely, the Court implied that, by virtue
of the dangers solicitation possessed that advertising lacked, the Court would
not afford attorney solicitation the same constitutional protection afforded to
attorney advertising. See id. at 366, 383-84; see also Paul S. Manning, Ohralik
v. Ohio State Bar Association: Do Bans on In-Person Solicitation by Attorneys
Make Sense?, 3 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTs. L.J. 329, 336 (1993) (explaining
that the Court denied solicitation First Amendment protection because, unlike
advertising, in-person solicitation created an enhanced opportunity for an at-
torney's strategic or manipulative behavior).
96. See, e.g., Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 645 (1951) (describing
solicitation as a "misuse of the great guarantees of free speech," even in the
context of a salesman soliciting door to door, selling magazine subscriptions);
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 773 n.25 (acknowledging the "en-
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addressed the issue in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n,97 and in In re
Primus.9s When the Court finally characterized the nature of attor-
ney solicitation, it described it as a "business transaction in which
speech is an essential but subordinate component."99 The Court's
articulation signified that it regarded attorney solicitation as a form
of speech undeserving of the same protection it afforded other forms
of commercial speech. Although the Court previously invoked a
balancing test of sorts in analyzing other commercial speech cases, 00
the Court seemed to abandon this approach when it was forced to
circumscribe the boundaries of permissible attorney in-person so-
licitation. 1' 1 Instead of a balancing test, the Court opted for a lower
level of judicial scrutiny.1
0 2
In explaining this standard of judicial scrutiny, the Court articu-
lated the following rationale upon which it based its analysis: "The
Rules prohibiting solicitation are prophylactic measures whose ob-
jective is the prevention of harm before it occurs .... [They seek] to
discipline a lawyer for soliciting employment for pecuniary gain un-
der circumstances likely to result in the adverse consequences the
State seeks to avert."' °3 This rationale contains two components: a
subjective and an objective component. The first component, as in-
dicated by the terms "soliciting employment for pecuniary gain,"'
104
refers to an analysis of subjective factors, namely the attorney's mo-
tive for soliciting. This factor is codified in the language of Model
Rule 7.3, and reflected in the rule's legislative history.
10 5
hanced possibility for confusion and deception if [attorneys] were to undertake
certain kinds of advertising").
97. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
98. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
99. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457.
100. See id. at 455 ("The balance struck in Bates does not predetermine the
outcome in this case."); Brandt, supra note 90, at 787-88.
101. See, e.g., Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 466-67 (discussing how and why the
Court condoned Ohio's prophylactic solicitation rule).
102. See id. at 457.
103. Id. at 464 (emphasis added).
104. Id.
105. See REICH, supra note 80, at 183-86.
244
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The Court also employed a second component in its analysis-
one which was not codified in Model Rule 7.3, nor discussed in its
legislative history. 0 6 The second component, as illustrated by the
phrase "under circumstances likely to result in adverse conse-
quences,"' 07 refers to an analysis of objective factors, namely the cir-
cumstances surrounding the actual solicitation. Together, these fac-
tors provided the Court with both the means and the tools with which
to determine whether an attorney solicitation was permissible. 08
2. Ohralik and Primus are put to the test
The Court utilized this two-part approach in its simultaneous yet
seemingly dichotomous decisions dealing with attorney solicitation
cases. In Ohralik, the Supreme Court confronted a classic case of
ambulance chasing. Albert Ohralik, a licensed attorney, learned of
an auto accident involving two young women, Carol McClintock and
Wanda Lou Holbert. 10 9 Oh ralik twice approached McClintock at her
hospital bed, offering to represent her in suing for personal injury
damages." 0 McClintock finally agreed to Ohralik's representation,
and signed a contingency fee agreement."' Obralik also approached
Holbert at her home the day she returned from the hospital, and
urged her to retain his services." 2 He used a concealed tape recorder
to record and preserve evidence of Holbert's oral assent to the repre-
sentation. "1 When Holbert and McClintock discharged Ohralik as
their attorney, he refused to withdraw as the attorney of record."
4
Consequently, both filed complaints against Ohralik for violations of
106. See id.; MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 (1998).
107. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464.
108. See id.; Primus, 436 U.S. at 434.
109. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 449.
110. See id. at450.
111. See id.
112. See id. at451.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 452.
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the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility"5 for engaging in di-
rect in-person solicitation." 6
In reviewing the Ohio Supreme Court's decision, the United
States Supreme Court noted that "[t]he solicitation of business by a
lawyer through direct, in-person communication with the prospective
client ha[d] long been viewed as inconsistent with the profession's
ideal of the attorney-client relationship and as posing a significant
potential for harm to the prospective client." ' 7 The Court's two-part
subjective and objective analysis served three important interests:
"[first,] reduc[ing] the likelihood of overreaching... and undue in-
fluence on laypersons; [second,] protect[ing] the privacy of [such]
individuals; and [third,]... avoid[ing] situations where the lawyer's
exercise of judgment on behalf of the client will be clouded by his
own pecuniary self-interest."'1
8
In employing the subjective prong of its analysis, the Court
readily determined that Ohralik was motivated by his own selfish,
pecuniary interests.119 First, Ohralik insisted on a contingency fee
agreement--"thereby tempting the young women with what sounded
like a cost-free and therefore irresistible offer.' 20 Second, even after
the two victims rightfully discharged Ohralik, he demanded a share
of their insurance recovery to settle a lawsuit he audaciously filed
against the women for breach of contract.' 2' The Court explained
that "impermissible solicitation[s] [are those] undertaken for pur-
poses of the attorney's pecuniary gain and... [do]... not includ[e]
offers of service to indigents without charge.'1 22  Since Ohralik's
conduct was motivated solely by the potential for his own financial
benefit, he engaged in an impermissible solicitation.
115. Ohralik called for an interpretation of Ohio's adaptation of the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility. It read in part: "A lawyer shall not rec-
ommend employment, as a private practitioner, of himself, his partner, or asso-
ciate to a non-lawyer who has not sought his advice regarding employment of a
lawyer." Id. at 453 n.9.
116. See id. at 452-53.
117. Id. at454.
118. Id. at461.
119. See id. at 467-68.
120. Id. at 467.
121. See id. at 452.
122. Id. at 462-63 n.20.
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After its subjective analysis of the solicitation, the Court ana-
lyzed the objective circumstances surrounding it.123  In fact, the
Court declared that the appropriate focus of its analysis was
Ohralik's conduct, and not his motives.' 24 The circumstances sur-
rounding the solicitation revealed a coercive and overreaching en-
counter. Ohralik approached McClintock and Holbert immediately
following a car accident which hospitalized both victims. 125 The
Court reasoned that, despite any value it may have in apprising vic-
tims of their legal rights, approaching a vulnerable individual is in-
trusive.126 The Court recognized that Ohralik's presence prevented
either woman from carefully deliberating and arriving at a well-
thought-out decision. 127 In upholding the state's prophylactic ban on
pecuniary-motivated in-person solicitation under such circum-
stances, 28 the Court concluded that Ohralik's improper motive and
objectively dangerous conduct resulted in an impermissible solicita-
tion-one which the First Amendment would not protect.129 The
Court's reliance on both objective and subjective factors yielded a
holding which not only upheld a prohibition of pecuniary-motivated
in-person attorney solicitations, but also formulated a new standard
regulating attorney solicitation practices. Therefore, contrary to the
ABA drafters' reading of the holding, the Court actually employed
an analysis containing both subjective and objective components.
123. See id. at 463.
124. See id.; see also Wishcamper, supra note 6, at 676 & n.27 (explaining
that the Court placed its primary focus on the circumstances of the solicita-
tion).
125. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at449.
126. See id. at 465.
127. See id. at 457.
128. The Court refused to require the state to prove actual injury to McClin-
tock and Holbert. See id. at 466-68. It acknowledged that the occurrence of an
in-person solicitation is not likely to be visible to the public-at-large, and con-
sequently goes unwitnessed. See id. at 466. Since it would be difficult to ob-
tain reliable proof that the incident occurred, the Court determined that a pro-
phylactic ban was appropriate in prohibiting all pecuniary-motivated
solicitations that take place under coercive circumstances. See id. at 466-67.
129. See id. at 467-68.
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While the Court employed the identical analysis in In re Pri-
mus, 130 a distinct result emerged.13' In Primus, ACLU attorney Edna
Smith Primus contacted Mary Etta Williams who had been allegedly
sterilized pursuant to a Medicare policy requiring the sterilization of
all Medicare beneficiaries.132 Upon learning of Williams's alleged
desire to institute a lawsuit, Primus wrote Williams a letter informing
her of the ACLU's offer of pro bono representation in the matter.
133
Rather than filing a lawsuit against the doctor who sterilized her,
Williams instead filed a complaint with the state bar against Primus
for solicitation.'
3 4
With Ohralik before it, the Court could easily distinguish Pri-
mus's conduct. The Court's majority first analyzed Primus's subjec-
tive motive. 135  Unlike Ohralik's pecuniary motive, 36 the Court
characterized Primus's motive as one of "seeking to further political
and ideological goals through... advis[ing] a lay person of her legal
rights and ... that free legal assistance [was] available .... 137 In
fact, the Court heralded Primus's politically-motivated solicitation
because such conduct promoted the civil rights of others, 38 and not
the pecuniary interests of the attorney.
139
The Court went on to engage in an objective analysis of the na-
ture and circumstances under which the solicitation took place.1
40
The Court first distinguished Oralik's overreaching and intrusive
solicitation from that of Primus's by noting the manner in which
the solicitation occurred.' 41 The solicitation in Primus did not take
place under conditions which placed Williams in a vulnerable or
130. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
131. See id. at 422. Interestingly enough, though surely not a coincidence,
the Court decided Ohralik and Primus on the very same day. See id. at 412;
Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 447.
132. See Primus, 436 U.S. at 416-17.
133. See id. at416.
134. See id. at 417.
135. See id. at 422.
136. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 467.
137. Primus, 436 U.S. at 414.
138. See id. at 422.
139. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 470 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment).
140. SeePrimus, 436 U.S. at422.
141. See id.
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compromising position.' 42 Primus sent Williams a letter following
an initial, informal meeting by the parties. The letter was not mis-
leading, and unlike a direct, face-to-face meeting, it did not present
the same risks of overreaching that existed in Ohralik.'43 The letter
merely contained pertinent information which informed Ms. Wil-
liams in a non-coercive manner about her rights and about the law-
suit.' 44 Moreover, the act of sending it would allow her to have time
and space to deliberate and arrive at a well-reasoned decision re-
garding her involvement.4 5 Therefore, by applying a subjective and
objective analysis, the Court found Primus's solicitation to be per-
missible. It lacked the impermissible motive and circumstances
which would otherwise condemn such behavior. 46  Together,
Ohralik and Primus established the two poles of permissible and im-
permissible attorney solicitations' 47 determined by both a subjective
and objective analysis.
While the majority opinions in each case relied quite heavily on
an objective analysis, the true importance of employing an objective
analysis is better discussed in the cases' minority opinions. Both
Justice Marshall's concurrence in Ohralik14' and Justice Rehnquist's
dissent in In re Primus149 focus-in varying degrees-on the signifi-
cance of the objective component of the Court's analysis. Although
Justice Marshall agreed with the majority's holding in condemning
142. See id. at 435.
143. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at468.
144. See Primus, 436 U.S. at 416-17 n.6. The relevant portion of the letter
read:
The American Civil Liberties Union would like to file a lawsuit on
your behalf for money against the doctor who performed the operation
.... [We] would like to explain what is involved so you can under-
stand what is going on .... [I]f you are interested, let me know, and
I'll let you know when we will come down to talk to you about it.
Id. at 416 n.6.
145. See id. at 435.
146. See id. at 422.
147. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 471 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment) ("Our holdings today deal... with situations at oppo-
site poles of the problem of attorney solicitation.").
148. See id. at 468-77 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
149. See Primus, 436 U.S. at 440-46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Ohralik's conduct, his concurrence argued that "[w]hat is objection-
able about Ohralik's behavior here is not so much that he solicited
business for himself, but rather the circumstances in which he per-
formed that solicitation and the means by which he accomplished
it."15 Justice Marshall contended that an emphasis on the objective
circumstances under which a solicitation occurred would promote
what he deemed to be "'benign' solicitations"' 5' or in other words,
solicitation by advice and information that is truthful and
that is presented in a non-coercive, nondeceitful, and digni-
fied manner to a potential client who is emotionally and
physically capable of making a rational decision either to
accept or reject the representation with respect to a legal
claim or matter that is not frivolous.
152
Similarly, Justice Rehnquist noted the importance of considering
objective factors. 153  Unlike Justice Marshall, however, Justice
Rehnquist disagreed with the majority opinions in both Primus and
Ohralik154 Justice Rehnquist instead endorsed the use of a purely
objective test to assess an attorney's conduct.'55 Justice Rehnquist
emphasized that to condemn Ohralik's pecuniary solicitation, while
150. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 470 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment).
151. Id. at 472 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment).
152. Id. at 472 n.3 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); cf Louisville Bar Ass'n v. Hubbard, 139 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Ky.
1940) (stating that an "attorney may personally solicit business... where he
does not take advantage of the ignorance, or weakness, or suffering, or human
frailties of the expected clients, and where no inducements are offered...
153. See Primus, 436 U.S. at 443 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
154. See id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In discussing the Court's holdings in
Ohralik and Primus, Justice Rehnquist sardonically remarked that:
One tale ends happily for the lawyer and one does not. If we were
given the latitude of novelists in deciding between happy and unhappy
endings for the heroes and villains of our tales, I might well join in the
Court's disposition of both cases .... But I remain unpersuaded by
the Court's opinions in these two cases that there is a principled basis
for concluding that the First... Amendment[] forbid[s] South Caro-
lina from disciplining Primus here, but permit[s] Ohio to discipline
Ohralik in the companion case.
Id. at 440-41.
155. See id. at 443 (Rehnquist J., dissenting).
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permitting Primus's politically-motivated one, was unjustified.156 He
further argued that
to the extent [the analysis] focuses upon the motive of the
speaker, it is subject to [the] manipulation [of] . . . clever
practitioners .... And we may be sure that the next lawyer
in Ohralik's shoes who is disciplined for similar conduct
will come here cloaked in the prescribed mantle of 'politi-
cal association' to assure [that his conduct is upheld].
57
Consequently, Justice Rehnquist urged the Court to adopt a purely
objective standard because the "danger of . . . [adverse] conse-
quences is [not] minimized simply because a lawyer proceeds from
political conviction rather than for pecuniary gain."' 58
An objective standard is a more effective measure of appropriate
conduct. Since a state can more readily regulate objective conduct,
as opposed to the motives underlying it,'59 consistent outcomes are
more likely to result. More specifically, "the difficulty of drawing
distinctions on the basis of ... the motive ... is a valid reason for
avoiding the undertaking where a more objective standard is readily
available."' 160 Accordingly, the heavy emphasis on an objective
standard in both the majority and minority opinions suggests that the
Ethics 2000 Committee should revamp Model Rule 7.3 to include an
objective component.
C. The Minority Becomes the Majority: Relying on Objective
Factors in Edenfield v. Fane
161
While the circumstances and nature of the solicitation played a
significant role in shaping the holdings of both Ohralik and Primus,
156. See id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 442 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 445 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Hill, supra note 5, at 416
(indicating that a motive test is ineffective because seeking political gain, fa-
vor, or publicity could also reap indirect pecuniary benefits).
159. See Primus, 436 U.S. at 443 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
"inquiry must focus on the character of the conduct which the State seeks to
regulate... [as] [t]he State is empowered to discipline for conduct which it
deems detrimental to the public interest...
160. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
161. 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
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the Court's holding in Edenfield v. Fane, decided over a decade after
Ohralik, further revealed the necessity and validity of an objective
analysis. In Edenfield, Scott Fane, a certified public accountant,
challenged the Florida Board of Accountancy Administration's rule
prohibiting certified public accountants from engaging in any unin-
vited, direct solicitation for business purposes. 62 Fane, who had re-
cently moved to Florida, sought to utilize telephone and in-person
solicitations to develop his client base and generate business.13 In
challenging the Florida ban on First and Fourteenth Amendment
grounds, Fane argued that solicitation was protected commercial
speech.'6
Despite the Court's holding in Ohralik, which condemned pecu-
niary-motivated attorney solicitations, the Court struck down the
Florida ban.' 65  The Court declared, contrary to its rationale in
Ohralik, that solicitation "is commercial expression to which the
protections of the First Amendment apply.' 166 While this pro-
nouncement seemingly contradicted the Court's previous declaration
in Ohralik,167 the Court reiterated the importance of an objective
analysis in assessing the permissibility of a solicitation. 68 Writing
for the majority, Justice Kennedy emphasized that Ohralik did not
stand for the proposition that "all personal solicitation is without
First Amendment protection (citation omitted) .... There are, no
doubt, detrimental aspects to personal commercial solicitation in
certain circumstances ... ,,169 In distinguishing Ohralik from Eden-
field, where both professionals possessed pecuniary motivations, the
Edenfield Court employed only an objective analysis 170 in upholding
162. See id. at763.
163. See id. at 763-65.
164. See id. at 764-65.
165. See id. at 763.
166. Id. at 765.
167. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457.
168. See Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 774-75; see also Brandt, supra note 90, at
809 (arguing that objective factors will enhance the effectiveness of a solicita-
tion rule).
169. Edenfleld, 507 U.S. at 765.
170. Some may argue that the Court was forced to employ an objective
analysis in order to successfully distinguish Edenfield from Ohralik, because
both professionals shared the same pecuniary motive for soliciting their re-
spective clients. While this theory could undermine the Court's approach in
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the accountant's solicitation in the latter case.171 This is exemplified
by Kennedy's statement that the circumstances in Edenfield "are not
so inherent or ubiquitous that solicitation of this sort is removed from
the ambit of First Amendment protection.'
172
Accordingly, in affording First Amendment protection to ac-
countant's solicitations under the commercial speech doctrine, the
Court first determined that the solicitation survived the scrutiny im-
posed by the newly-created, four-part Central Hudson test.173 How-
ever, apart from the constitutional analysis, the Court sought to fur-
ther distinguish Ohralik from Edenfield. It did so by invoking an
objective analysis. First, the Court distinguished Edenfield based on
the nature of the solicitation, as well as on the skills and training in
the art of persuasion possessed by the professional involved.' 74 The
Edenfield, it would only truly undermine it if the Court had relied solely on a
subjective analysis in Ohralik, and employed only an objective analysis to dis-
tinguish Fane's conduct. But since the Court relied on both subjective, and ar-
guably more heavily on objective criteria in rendering its respective opinions,
this is not likely the case.
171. Justice O'Connor's dissent noted the Court's difficulty in viably distin-
guishing these two cases. O'Connor failed to see how professional distinctions
alone could produce inconsistent results in these two cases. See Edenfield, 507
U.S. at 779 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She argued that since all professionals
receive specialized training, accountants are just as likely to use their training
and expertise to mislead or coerce naive prospective clients as an attorney
might be inclined to. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In sum, she did not
believe that, constitutionally, these cases warranted different outcomes. See id.
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 766.
173. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1980). This case, decided after the attorney so-
licitation cases, replaced the previous balancing test with a more formal, four-
part analysis: whether (1) the speech was lawful and not misleading; (2) the
state's interests in proscribing speech were substantial; (3) the challenged
regulation advanced these interests in a direct and material way; and (4) the
extent of the restriction on protected speech was reasonably related to the in-
terests served. See id. at 566. The Edenfield Court held that the first three
prongs of the Central Hudson test were satisfied, and upheld the speech with-
out reaching the fourth prong of the analysis. See Edenfield, 507 U.S.. at 767;
L. Kyle Heffley, Commercial Speech Face-to-Face Solicitation by Certified
Public Accountants (But Not Attorneys?) Is Protected Speech Under the First
Amendment, 16 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 683, 694-95 (1994) (discussing the
Court's holding and expounding on the reasoning behind it).
174. See Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 774. But see Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 779-80
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potential for manipulation and overreaching is greater when an attor-
ney, professionally trained in the art of persuasion, solicits a client in
a face-to-face encounter.175 In contrast, accountants receive "training
[which] emphasizes independence and objectivity, not advocacy.'
176
The Court made an additional distinction relating to the degree
of susceptibility of the client. Attorneys who are inclined to solicit
business tend to solicit clients who are either indigent or vulnerable,
and desperate for legal assistance, as the victims arguably were in
Ohralik.177 On the other hand, the Court characterized the "typical
client of a CPA [to be] far less susceptible to manipulation... [be-
cause] prospective clients are sophisticated and experienced business
executives who understand the services that a CPA offers."'
17
Finally, the Court distinguished accountant solicitations from
attorney solicitations based on their respective nature. The Court
condemned attorney solicitation on the basis that it unduly pressures
and often coerces a client into accepting representation without
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (asserting that distinctions drawn based on the pro-
fession of the solicitor should not be sustained).
175. See id. at 775; see also Fane v. Edenfield, 945 F.2d 1514, 1521 (11th
Cir. 1991) (Edmondson, J., dissenting). Edmondson believed that the potential
for abuse stemmed from an attorney's "specialized knowledge beyond that of
their solicited clients." Id. Moreover,
[t]his special leverage, or ability to pressure others.., is not so much
a function of their oratory skill; instead, it stems from the gap in
knowledge between the professional and the lay person .... The dan-
ger lies with the lawyer who intimidates or baits the potential client
with the lawyer's specialized knowledge while simultaneously preying
on the client's relative ignorance.
Id. See, e.g., Brandt, supra note 90, at 804 (expounding on Judge Edmond-
son's dissent, and arguing that, while lawyers are specifically trained to serve
as advocates, few are actually involved in litigation or advocacy in their re-
spective practices).
176. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 775; see also Heffley, supra note 173, at 698-99
(attributing the holding to professional distinctions). But see Fane, 945 F.2d at
1521 (Edmondson, J., dissenting) (arguing that professional distinctions are not
a sound basis for distinguishing attorney from accountant solicitations because
CPAs have the same capacity and specialized knowledge as do attorneys to
entice, coerce, or intimidate potential clients).
177. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 449-51.
178. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 775. But see Brandt, supra note 90, at 805
(questioning whether or not potential clients of CPA's are truly experienced
and sophisticated).
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affording the client adequate time to make a rational decision. 179
Conversely, accountants are likely to solicit clients by '"meet[ing]
[them] in their own offices at a time of [the client's] choosing."' 18
Such an environment is "conducive to rational and considered deci-
sionmaking by the prospective client, in sharp contrast to the 'unin-
formed acquiescence' to which the accident victims in Ohralik were
prone.",'8' Moreover, an informal office meeting does not pressure
the potential client, nor does it create an expectation that the client
must retain the accountant then and there. 182 Thus, the emphasis the
Court placed on objective factors in assessing the permissibility of a
solicitation, whether it be in the attorney or accountant context, ex-
emplifies the need for the incorporation of an objective analysis in
Model Rule 7.3.
V. PUBLiC PoucY RATIONALES
Apart from the justifications and rationales offered by the Su-
preme Court in the attorney and accountant solicitation cases, a rule
that incorporates both an objective and subjective component would
better serve public policy interests. Specifically, because this two-
prong test seeks to prevent pecuniary-motivated solicitations that oc-
cur in overbearing and oppressive circumstances, the adoption of
such a test would effectively eliminate the dangerous type of solici-
tation seen in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n. 83 Further, such a
rule would also permit solicitations to occur under benign circum-
stances that seek to promote civil rights or the public interest as seen
in In re Primus. 84  This sort of benign solicitation' 85 serves to
promote two public policy interests: first, it encourages philan-
thropic work and community outreach in making legal services more
179. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457.
180. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 776.
181. Id. at 775.
182. See id. at 776; see also Brandt, supra note 90, at 805-06 (explaining the
limitations on the Court's rationale).
183. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
184. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
185. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 472 n.3 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
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accessible; 86 and second, it helps to dispel the poor image of attor-
neys as greedy professionals.
187
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.3 insinuates
that attorneys possess an affirmative duty, by virtue of their profes-
sion, to make legal counsel available both to indigents and to the
community at large.'88 In promoting philanthropic behavior, the Bar
seeks to "assure the maximum amount of useful information to the
public with the minimum amount of potential harm."' 89 According
to the Preliminary Report of a National Survey by the Special Com-
mittee to Survey Legal Needs of the American Bar Association,
thirty-three percent of respondents had never consulted a lawyer,
while another twenty percent of those surveyed had given serious
thought to consulting a lawyer, but failed to do so. 190 The ABA
study further revealed that one of the most common reasons laypeo-
ple do not seek out attorneys is because they do not know where or
how to find competent legal assistance. '9' Moreover, the same study
186. See id. at 470-71 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). Justice Marshall reminded the Court that attorneys possess both a
responsibility to perform pro bono work and a "responsibility for providing le-
gal services for those unable to pay ...." Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment). Moreover, he urged, "[E]very lawyer, re-
gardless of professional prominence or professional workload, should... par-
ticipate in serving the disadvantaged." Id. at 471 (Marshall, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
187. See id. at 471-72 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
188. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 (1998); see
also FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 118 (discussing the legal profession's duty to
make legal counsel available to the public). See generally Wilbur, supra note
6 (discussing the scope of an attorney's affirmative duty to provide legal serv-
ices to those in need of representation). Recall that the Supreme Court her-
aided the pro bono solicitation of attorney Primus in In re Primus for her self-
less efforts to advance the civil liberties of the client. See Primus, 436 U.S. at
422.
189. LORI B. ANDREWS, BIRTH OF A SALESMAN: LAWYER ADVERTISING
AND SOLICITATION 86 (1980).
190. See BARBARA A. CURRAN & FRANCIS 0. SPALDING, PRELIMINARY
REPORT OF A NATIONAL SURVEY BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO SURVEY
LEGAL NEEDS OF THE AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION 85-86 (1980).
191. See id. at 94-95 tbl. 7.1 (reporting that 48.3% of those surveyed strongly
agreed that a lot of people do not obtain counsel because they do not know
who to retain, or whether the person is competent to represent them).
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indicated that 56.8% of those surveyed agreed that the legal system
favored the rich and powerful at the expense of the lower and middle
classes. 192  Yet 69.8% of respondents also believed that the legal
system can effectively contend with the problems of laypeople, and
not solely those of the wealthy.193 Collectively, these conflicting re-
sponses indicate that laypeople perceive the legal system as inacces-
sible or unavailable to them.
194
The Supreme Court recognized the ever-growing need to make
legal services known 95 and available to disadvantaged individu-
als. 196 In response, the Bar hoped to make legal services available
192. See id. at 95.
193. See id.
194. Likewise, the Supreme Court even recognized that the absence of
commercial speech results in public disillusionment with the profession:
The absence of [commercial speech] .. .reflect[s] the profession's
failure to reach out and serve the community: Studies reveal that
many persons do not obtain counsel even when they perceive a need
because... of an inability to locate a competent attorney .... [T]he
profession... condon[es] the actions of [an] attorney who structures
his social or civic associations so as to provide contacts with potential
clients.
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 370-71 (1977).
195. The Court admitted that, while there is a need to make legal services
available, a stigma associated with legal commercial speech exists because at-
torney advertising and solicitation appears unprofessional. See id. The Court
emphasize[d] the need for information that will assist persons desiring
legal services to choose lawyers .... [While] advertising is the most
commonly used and useful means of providing information as to
goods and other services ... it generally has not been used with re-
spect to legal ... services ... [because it] ... would tend to mislead
rather than inform.
Id. at 397 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Despite this
need, the Court limited its holding in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, and failed
to automatically afford in-person solicitation the same protection that the Court
afforded to pharmacists engaged in commercial speech. See id. at 366 n.17.
196. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 471 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment). The Court hailed attorney Primus for "communicat-
ing an offer of free assistance by attorneys ... to advance the civil-libert[y]
objectives" of Williams, a disadvantaged client--speech "protected by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments." Primus, 436 U.S. at 422. The Court went
on to say that "The First and the Fourteenth Amendments require a measure of
protection for... 'advising another that his legal rights have been infringed."'
Id. at 432 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963)).
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through the implementation of programs and services such as group
legal service plans, lawyer referral programs, bar-sponsored legal
clinics, and public service law firms.197 Nonetheless, the "profession
recognizes that less success has been achieved in assuring that per-
sons who can afford to pay modest fees have access to lawyers com-
petent and willing to represent theni"'198 This problem is most
prominent in large, diverse metropolitan communities where the le-
gal community is more isolated.' 99 Unless the legal community can
reach out to middle and lower-class populations, "consumers will be
forced to select legal representation on the basis of haphazard and
often irrelevant criteria., 200 Hence, a rule allowing for benign so-
licitations would encourage attorneys to reach out to make their legal
services known and available to those in need.
Not only does a benign solicitation rule increase the availability
of legal services, but it also provides attorneys with actual opportu-
nities to educate the public about their legal rights. 201 The American
Bar Association Journal recently reported that the ban on solicitation
not only makes it more difficult for low-income individuals to learn
about their legal rights, but it unfairly provides insurance company
defendants with an easy opportunity to settle claims quickly and
cheaply.202 If individuals are ignorant of their legal rights and reme-
dies, victims are deprived of the justice they deserve.
Furthermore, a Model Rule permitting benign solicitations
would improve the image of legal professionals. By encouraging the
performance of at least fifty hours of yearly pro bono legal serv-
ices, 20 3 the ABA hopes that attorneys will reach out to their local
communities, and educate citizens about their legal rights and avail-
able services.20 4 Moreover, the ABA hopes that this involvement
197. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 398; Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 473-75 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
198. Bates, 433 U.S. at 398.
199. See Maute, supra note 88, at 533.
200. Id. (citing B. CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE
MEANS: SOME PROBLEMS OF AVAILABILITY OF LEGAL SERVICES 1826
(1970)).
201. See id. at 532-33.
202. See Michael Higgins, A New Attitude, 83 A.B.A. J. 27, 27 (1997).
203. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 (1998).
204. See id. Rule 6.1 ct(1).
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will provide attorneys with opportunities to fulfill their professional
and community responsibilities in championing the causes of the dis-
advantaged.2°5 If attorneys fail to perform pro bono work, a modem
version of the medieval idea "that... courts ought to exist only for
those sufficiently aggrieved to pursue their remedies ' 206 will mani-
fest itself. Interjecting this notion into social thought will produce a
result whereby 'the wealthy, knowledgeable, and aggressive are fa-
vored over the poor, ignorant and timid. 20 7 By allowing benign so-
licitations, not only can attorneys offer immediate assistance to cli-
ents, but they can work to improve their professional image.
Finally, while the Model Rules lay a foundation for basic ethical
concerns that should guide attorneys in their practice, they exemplify
only a framework of bare minimum standards for ethical behavior:
"the [Model] Rules, do not, however, exhaust the moral and ethical
considerations that should inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human
activity can be completely defined by legal rules .... [They] simply
provide a framework for the ethical practice of law., 208 It is impera-
tive that attorneys realize the limitations inherent within the Rules
because "a professional ideal contains explicitly moral features [but]
does not even guarantee that the realization of that ideal is compati-
ble with living a morally acceptable life. [There is no] guarantee that
a good lawyer will be or even can be a good person.,
20 9
Lawyers should remember that apart from their professional
lives, they too are people-much like the clients they represent. They
should hold fast to personal morals and common sense notions of
justice to guide their professional actions and decisions. Due to the
inherent limitations imposed by the ethics rules, however, while cer-
tain behavior may conform to an individual's personal ethics or mor-
als, it may offend those set forth in the ethics rules or statutes. In
other words, irrespective of whether it is permissible under the
205. See id.
206. Gipson, supra note 44, at 1189.
207. Id.
208. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope 14 (1998).
209. Susan Wolf Ethics, Legal Ethics, and the Ethics of Law, in THE GOOD
LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 38, 51 (David Luban ed.,
1983).
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parameters of Model Rule 7.3, many attorneys would nonetheless of-
fer to assist a pro se individual out of sympathy, perhaps empathy, or
because their individual morals dictate it. A rule employing both an
objective and a subjective analysis would not only condone these in-
teractions, but facilitate them. It would also allow attorneys who
subscribe to a higher set of individual moral standards to act in ac-
cordance with them
°210
VI. CONCLUSION
Model Rule 7.3 is only partially successful in enacting an ethics
rule regarding attorney solicitation that is not only consistent with,
but reflective of, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence. In articulating
the standard for evaluating attorney solicitations, the Court stated
that the rule was intended to "discipline a lawyer for soliciting em-
ployment for pecuniary gain under circumstances likely to result in
the adverse consequences the State seeks to avert.",21 However, the
"pecuniary motive" language of Model Rule 7.3 adopts only a sub-
jective analysis. In disregarding the objective analysis, the drafters
crafted a rule that is difficult to apply212 because it is "subject to ma-
nipulation by clever practitioners., 213 Practically speaking, a purely
subjective rule proves to be ineffective in addressing all of the
"evils" inherent in attorney solicitation. 14 In fact, the modern trend,
as reflected by the Court's opinion in Edenfield v. Fane,1 5 seems to
advocate the use of objective factors. Whether Justice Rehnquist's
dissent in Primus influenced other members of the Court or whether
they acted of their own accord, the Court employed a purely objec-
tive analysis in Edenfield.1 6 In doing so, the Court communicated
the importance of evaluating the circumstances surrounding a solici-
tation to better assess its viability.
210. See generally id. (reconciling professional responsibility with personal
morals).
211. Ohralikv. Ohio StateBarAss'n, 436 U.S. 447,464 (1978).
212. See Wishcamper, supra note 6, at 680.
213. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 442 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
214. See Wishcamper, supra note 6, at 680.
215. 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
216. See id. at 775-76.
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More importantly, however, public policy concerns mandate the
incorporation of an objective component. Because a two-pronged
test can more effectively address both the subjective and objective
evils that plague attorney solicitations, it will successfully weed out
inherently dangerous solicitations, while permitting benign solicita-
tions to occur. As Justice Marshall argued, attorneys have a duty to
serve and represent the disadvantaged.217 As attorney Solomon Cohn
did in the opening scenario, 18 one way of providing legal services to
indigent clients with important personal or public issues is through
happenstance meetings and subsequent offering of services. A rule
that permits these benign solicitations-solicitations free of pecuni-
ary motives and coercive circumstances-not only promotes philan-
thropy among attorneys and improves their reputation, but it helps
return accountability to the justice system. Without some form of
safe attorney solicitation, the justice system will continue to anony-
mously victimize innocent pro se clients who simply are ill-equipped
to tackle the system
The Ethics 2000 Committee of the American Bar Association
should revamp Model Rule 7.3 and formulate a rule that eliminates
the dangers associated with solicitation. Such a rule would better
serve and protect pro se and indigent clients. Furthermore, it will
help restore accountability to the legal system and the legal profes-
sion to its roots-where attorneys are individuals willing to devote
their time, energy, and a piece of themselves to serving others.
Betina A. Suessmann*
217. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 471 (1978) (Mar-
shall, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
218. See supra Part I.
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